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Abstract
In the literature on transitional justice, there is disagreement about whether countries like theUnited
States can be characterized as transitional societies. Though it is widely recognized that transitional
justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations can be used by Global North nations
to address racial injustice, some consider societies to be transitional only when they are undergoing a
formal democratic regime change. We conceptualize the political situation of low-income Black
communities under the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime in terms of three criteria for
identifying transitional contexts: normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural
inequality, and the failure of the rule of law. That these criteria are met, however, does not necessarily
mean that a transition is taking place. Drawing on the American political development and abolition
democracy literatures, we discuss what it would mean for the United States to transition out of its
present imprisonment and policing regime. A transitional justice perspective shows the importance of
not only pushing for truth and reparation, but for an actual transition.
Keywords: Transitional Justice; Reparations; Policing; Mass Incarceration; Abolitionism;
Democracy
Introduction
Transitional justice is a way for societies to come to terms with injustice and violence,
particularly in the context of a formal democratic regime change. Truth commissions and
reparations are among transitional justice’s various mechanisms and aim to provide
accountability for past abuses and to lay the groundwork for democratic rule to supplant
the rule of force.
Within the transitional justice literature, it is contentious as to how to conceptualize
injustice and violence in the context of Global North nations like the United States. Black
Americans, particularly those who live in segregated, low-income communities, are subject
disproportionately to police violence, overpunishment, and a wide range of structural
inequalities. Is the United States a transitional context? There is little doubt that the
mechanisms of transitional justice can be used in societies that are not undergoing a formal
regime change.Truth commissions and reparations programs have taken place in countries
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like the United States, Canada, and Australia to address legacies of historical injustices
(Ladisch and Roccatello, 2021). However, as Rosemary Nagy (2008) writes, “it is also
rather awkward to affix the label ‘transitional’ to justice long denied in liberal democracies.
To say that the transition to democracy is as yet incomplete or that we are transitioning to a
reconciled,more just society,may overly broaden notions of democratisation or transition”
(p. 281). There is, in other words, a potential misnomer in describing anti-Black institutional
racism in the United States as a transitional context. What is specifically transitional about
this context—namely, an in-progress regime change—is arguably lost in such a description.
This article analyzes imprisonment and policing-based state violence against Black
Americans using a transitional justice framework. Drawing on Colleen Murphy’s (2017)
recent conceptual work, we discuss the political situation of low-income Black communi-
ties in terms of three categories for identifying transitional contexts: normalized collective and
political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality, and the failure of the rule of law. But, we
argue, there are also respects in which the United States departs from paradigmatic
transitional contexts. An important insight about the meaning of transitional justice in
the Global North follows. An ever-present hazard is the exclusive focus on transitional
justice’s mechanisms and a reckoning with history while failing to acknowledge when
present circumstances warrant a full-blown regime change. (“Regimes” can be understood
not only as the formal structures of governance, but also as political orders.) The mech-
anisms of truth and reparation are essential for accountability; but unless we conceptualize
the United States as in need of a transition, there is only so much these mechanisms would
accomplish. A transitional justice perspective, then, shows that there needs to be what
contemporary abolitionists have long recognized: a complete transformation in the existing
way of policing and punishing Black people in the United States. This, paired with truth
and reparation, would be transitional justice.
In addition to making this argument our analysis has two further aims. First, it advances
the debate on the applicability of transitional justice theory to the Global North, working
out the commonalities between the U.S. and paradigmatic transitional contexts and
discussing what it means for Global North countries to undergo a transition. In particular,
we argue for the relevance of “abolition democracy” to conceptualizing regime change in
the context of the United States. This concept originated in the thought of W. E. B. Du
Bois ([1935]1998) and is taken up by Angela Y. Davis (2005) and the contemporary prison
abolition movement.
Second, in public discussion about reparations to Black Americans, transitional justice is
an infrequently used but powerful concept. Those who advocate including Global North
nations in transitional justice’s scope are at least in part motivated by the objectionableness
ofmarking out “emerging democracies” that require transitional justice in order to become
like “established democracies,”where the concerns of transitional justice ostensibly do not
apply (e.g., Hansen 2011, p. 40). Against the backdrop of a racial ideology “that blames
Blacks themselves for their poorer relative economic standing, seeing it as the function of
perceived cultural inferiority” instead of an unjust and dysfunctional sociopolitical order,
there is rhetorical power in showing what the present-day United States has in common
with pre-transitional contexts that are widely recognized as such (Bobo and Kleugel, 1997,
p. 95).
Transitional Justice in the United States?
Let us begin by looking more closely at the question of whether Global North countries
can be characterized as “transitional.” Authors like Andrew Valls (2003), Stephen Winter
(2014), and ourselves (King and Page, 2018) have argued that the tools of transitional
justice—truth commissions, reparations, memorialization and memory projects, political
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apologies, and so on—can help these nations grapple with legacies of violence and
exclusion. Using these tools, a society with formally democratic features, such as demo-
cratic elections, can work toward becoming a more substantive democracy. Adjoa
A. Aiyetoro (2011) makes the formal–substantive democracy distinction in the context of
the United States. Though Black voter suppression is a continuing threat to the formal
democratic status of U.S. elections (Anderson 2018), elections take place at regular,
predictable intervals. Notwithstanding the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol and the
White supremacist politics that fueled it (Nevius 2021; Smith and King, 2021), so do
transitions of power. However, Aiyetoro (2011) points out, while “many tout the United
States as being themost advanced democracy… significant portions of its citizens are living
under conditions or vestiges of oppression” (p. 635). True democracy requires substantive
democracy, she argues, and “substantive democracy requires each citizen to be valued and
heard equally” (p. 636). This is far from the case for the descendants of enslaved persons,
but Aiyetoro thinks reparations are a promising pathway to the United States becoming a
substantive democracy.
Though Aiyetoro’s aim is to lay out an argument for reparations for Black Americans,
not to provide a theory of transitional justice, her formal–substantive democracy distinc-
tion offers a way in which the United States might be thought of as a transitional political
context. But many scholars understand transitional justice as explicitly concerned with the
context of a formal democratic regime change. Harry Hobbs (2016) characterizes the field
of transitional justice as “wedded to the paradigmatic transition—a liberal democratic state
rising from the ashes of a collapsed authoritarian regime” (p. 512).1 This is the context Ruti
G. Teitel (2014) was thinking of in her writings that brought the term “transitional justice”
tomainstream scholarly attention in the early 1990s; the same goes forNeil J. Kritz’s (1995)
four-volume Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes
(Arthur 2009). Alexandra Barahona de Brito and colleagues (2001) similarly understand
transitional justice as addressing the “legacies of repression” that “societies face during a
transition from authoritarian or totalitarian to democratic rule” (p. 1). Some definitions,
however, see the requirement of a democratic regime change as too narrow, recognizing
that in practice, questions of transitional justice can arise after civil or international wars,
and that a regime change with democratic aspirations does not necessarily produce
democracy. For Anja Mihr (2021), transitional justice is “a concept and a process that
encompasses a number of different legal, political, and cultural instruments and mecha-
nisms that can strengthen, weaken, enhance, or accelerate processes of regime change and
consolidation” (p. 1). Alice MacLachlan and Allen Speight (2013) see transitional justice’s
context as the aftermath “of conflict or regime change, [when] political actors confront
questions of individual and collective responsibility—and thus, the need for accountability
and legal justice—without stable, recognizable sources of legal and political authority to
draw upon” (p. 3).2
A recent book byMurphy (2017) is one of themost thoroughgoing theoretical efforts to
conceptualize transitional justice. As Murphy argues, transitional justice isn’t only about
the mechanisms that are commonly associated with it. Rather, it is a distinct form of justice
that can be achieved (or not) in the domain to which it is specific. Just as distributive justice
concerns the domain of how goods and opportunities are allocated and corrective justice
concerns the domain of civil wrongs, transitional justice concerns the “just pursuit of
societal transformation” (Murphy 2017, p. 112). Paradigmatic transitional contexts include
the end of apartheid rule in South Africa, the end of the BosnianWar, and the recent peace
agreement between the Colombian government and The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) (cf. Ní Aoláin and Campbell, 2005, pp. 179-182). In such contexts,
whether the future will bring stability or a reemergence of past violence is a genuinely
uncertain matter—one study shows that ninety percent of civil wars in the 2000s are the
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resumption of civil wars that had previously ended (Walter 2015). What happens in the
transition period can thus play an important role in promoting a lasting peace. According to
Murphy (2017), transitional justice aims at transforming societies characterized by four
necessary conditions: normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural
inequality, serious existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority.
Authors who think that the tools of transitional justice can be applied without consid-
ering the currentUnited States a bona fide transitional context have a point: These tools are
valuable ways of addressing past and present injustice. At the same time, explicitly consid-
ering commonalities between paradigmatic transitional contexts and the United States can
ground a penetrating critique of the latter—in particular its imprisonment and policing
regime. Two of Murphy’s criteria—normalized collective and political wrongdoing and perva-
sive structural inequality—apply straightforwardly to the political situation of low-income
African American communities under this regime, as does as a third criterion—failure of the
rule of law.
Conceptualizing the U.S. Imprisonment and Policing Regime
Normalized Collective and Political Wrongdoing
Murphy (2017) defines normalized collective and political wrongdoing as “the actions or
omissions of particular human beings that result in violations of human rights” (pp. 49-50).
Such wrongdoing often targets members of structurally disadvantaged groups—“the
vulnerability to abuse and human rights violations increases when there is an absence of
minimum level of respect and recognition of the humanity of members of a certain group”
(Murphy 2017, p. 61).
Police killings and violence towards BlackAmericans are a visible example of normalized
collective and political wrongdoing. Consider the findings of a 1998Human RightsWatch
report of the United States:
Police abuse remains one of the most serious and divisive human rights violations in
the United States. The excessive use of force by police officers, including unjustified
shootings, severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment, persists because
overwhelming barriers to accountability make it possible for officers who commit
human rights violations to escape due punishment and often to repeat their offenses.
Police or public officials greet each new report of brutality with denials or explain that
the act was an aberration, while the administrative and criminal systems that should
deter these abuses by holding officers accountable instead virtually guarantee them
impunity….
In the cities we have examined where such data are available, minorities have alleged
human rights violations by police more frequently thanWhite residents and far out of
proportion to their representation in those cities. Police have subjected minorities to
apparently discriminatory treatment and have physically abused minorities while
using racial epithets.Mistreatment may be non-violent harassment and humiliation…
At worst, it includes the kinds of extreme violence we feature in this report (Human
Rights Watch 1998, pp. 25, 39).
Little has changed in subsequent decades. A report of the UnitedNationsWorking Group
of Experts on People of African Descent in 2016 identified “alarming levels of police
brutality and excessive use of lethal force by law enforcement officials, committed with
impunity against people of African descent in the United States” (UNHRC 2016, p. 7).
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Researchers have found that Blackmen face a 2.5 times higher risk of being killed by police
compared to their White male counterparts, and a 1 in 1000 risk overall (Edwards et al.,
2019). Moreover, killings by police are “only the tip of the iceberg in what is a pervasive
racial bias in the justice system,” according to the United Nations report (2016, p. 8).
Testimonies of Black Americans revealed “a pattern of police practices which violate their
human rights: they are disproportionately targeted for police surveillance, and experience
and witness public harassment, excessive force, and racial discrimination” (UNHRC
2016, p. 8).
When it comes toMurphy’s concept of normalized collective and political wrongdoing,
“normalized” is a key aspect. When state violence is normalized, it is not a matter of bad
apple officials acting on their own. Rather, the laws, institutional rules, and norms
governing their conduct promote wrongful behavior (Alexander 2010; Bobo and Thomp-
son, 2010; Butler 2016, 2017; Carbado 2017; Obasogie and Newman, 2018, 2019;
Obasogie 2020; Roberts 2007). The cornerstone of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
police excessive force, Graham v. Connor (1989), is an illustrative example. Rather than
giving clear guidelines about when the use of force by police officers violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of individuals (Obasogie and Newman, 2019), Graham (1989) instead
lays out a standard where the use of force should be judged “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene” (p. 396). The standard purports to be objective, and
references the seriousness of the crime, the threat posed by the suspect to the officers or
others, and non-compliance by the suspect as factors relevant to assessing whether an
officer used force reasonably (Graham 1989). At the same time, it is designed to give weight
to “the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force
that is necessary in a particular situation”; the ruling explicitly cautions against evaluating
police decisions “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (Graham 1989, p. 396). This creates a
presumption where a police officer’s judgment is not second-guessed by the court. Even
though Graham overturns a prior ruling, Johnson v. Glick (1973), rejecting its requirement
of an officer’s bad intent, it agrees with Johnson that “‘Not every push or shove, even if it
may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers’… violates the Fourth
Amendment” (Graham 1989, pp. 396-397).
The latitude Graham gives police is captured by the circumstances and outcome of the
case itself. Dethorne Graham, a diabetic Black man, was experiencing an insulin shock,
went into a store to buy orange juice, but left because the line was too long. Charlotte police
found this suspicious, and confronted and arrested Graham. The Court makes nomention
of Graham’s resisting arrest—indeed, Graham passed out before he was handcuffed—but
the officers’ rough treatment resulted in “a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised
forehead, and an injured shoulder” (Graham 1989, p. 390). On remand, a jury took up the
Supreme Court’s newly-minted standard and found that the police had acted reasonably
(Obasogie 2020).
Police interactions are not the only context where African Americans face normalized
human rights violations under theU.S. imprisonment and policing regime. A report by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Mississippi, Suffering in Silence: Human Rights
Abuses in St. Louis Correctional Centers (2009), relies on the testimony of corrections officers
and emergency medical technicians to detail physical and sexual abuse by their colleagues,
overcrowded and squalid living conditions, medical inattention, and—inexplicably—the
practice of forcing inmates to sit naked in freezing cells during winter months. Alabama
state prisons were the subject of a recent U.S. Department of Justice investigation (DOJ
2019), which found systemic failures by theAlabamaDepartment ofCorrections to prevent
and investigate prisoner-on-prisoner violence, including sexual violence, that often went
unreported. This in part resulted from understaffing and the inadequate supervision of
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prisoners. The DOJ reports of prisoners being “tied up for days” without corrections
officers noticing; one prisoner found by guards couldn’t talk due to injuries to his mouth
and required an emergency surgery to remove a rectally-inserted broomstick (DOJ 2019).
To the extent that deaths are tracked, the homicide rate in Alabama prisons is eight times
the national level (DOJ 2019).
Harsh prison conditions are not only for those convicted of crimes; there is also the
matter of pretrial detention. Infamously, sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder was accused of
stealing a backpack and arrested.Hemaintained his innocence and spent almost three years
awaiting his trial in the Rikers Island prison complex. There Browder endured beatings by
corrections officers and other inmates and two years of solitary confinement; after his
release, he committed suicide (Schwirtz and Winerip, 2015). One study shows that the
average cost of bail is $2,786 for misdemeanor detainees (Heaton et al., 2017). Of the half-
million people in pretrial detention in the United States, 43% are Black (Sawyer 2019).
Perhaps controversially, excessive punishment itself might fall under the heading of
normalized collective and political wrongdoing.MirkoBagaric and colleagues (2017) argue
that long prison terms are so threatening to what human rights discourse aims to secure for
all human beings that over-imprisonment is a human rights abuse. They make the point
that long-term prisoners cannot procreate and are severely restricted in how they partic-
ipate in family life. Many deemed China’s longtime one-child policy an “assault on human
rights” (Tai 2016).Why isn’t the situation of long-term prisoners considered thusly? Long
prison sentences are also associated with reduced education and employment prospects and
lower life expectancy (Bagaric et al, 2017), as well as formal collateral consequences such as
restrictions on political participation and public housing benefits (Travis 2002).3 These are
the precise kinds of deprivations with which human rights frameworks are concerned.
Pervasive Structural Inequality
Even if one rejects the view that over-imprisonment itself counts as normalized collective
and political wrongdoing, incarceration is deeply linked to another one of Murphy’s
criteria for identifying transitional contexts—pervasive structural inequality. Here, indi-
viduals are “differentially limited in the range of opportunities they can feasibly achieve”
(Murphy 2017, p. 46). Scholars have found that poor Black children have extremely low
rates of mobility, something not explained by class alone. Those coming from homes in the
bottom quintile of household income have a 2.5% chance of making it to the top quintile,
whereasWhite children born into the bottom quintile have a 10.6% chance (Chetty et al.,
2020). A study by BruceWestern (2002) links income inequality and incarceration: Serving
time in prison hinders the development of job skills, creates the stigma of having a criminal
record, and makes it hard for individuals to form or maintain employment networks. As
Western shows, the income inequality–incarceration link is empirically demonstrable and
partially explains the Black–White earnings gap since African Americans face dispropor-
tionate imprisonment rates. As of 2018, this was five times the rate ofWhite Americans; for
Black men ages thirty-five to thirty-nine, one in twenty were in federal or state prison
(Gramlich 2020).
In addition to facing inequalities in mobility, income, and incarceration—combined
with inequalities in wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 2006), education (Orfield and Franken-
berg, 2014), and health and life expectancy (Jackman and Shauman, 2019)—Black residents
of segregated, high-poverty communities do not interact with state officials on the same
terms as their White, well-to-do counterparts, something Murphy (2017) identifies as
fundamental to a structurally equal society. Monica C. Bell’s (2017) theory of legal
estrangement encapsulates Murphy’s point perfectly. Bell contests the common idea that
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poor Black Americans are second-class citizens in U.S. society: Overpoliced and under-
protected by law enforcement institutions, “these groups often see themselves as essentially
stateless—unprotected by the law and its enforcers and marginal to the project of making
American society” (Bell 2017, p. 2057). Legal estrangement describes the collective sense of
anomie within marginalized Black communities towards the legal and criminal justice
system, paired with the material realities that give rise to anomic group consciousness.
To bring the theoretical concept of legal estrangement to life, Bell tells the story of a
Shawna, a youth raised in Gilmor Homes in West Baltimore. An avid basketball player,
Shawna was accustomed to games being interrupted by gun violence. When she was
younger, she had wanted to be a police officer, but as she grew older, she heard stories
of police violence, including sexual assault by a police officer, in her community. She also
had negative experiences with police that have led her to avoid West Baltimore’s main
shopping center, Mondawmin Mall. These negative experiences would not garner “the
attention of journalists, researchers, or most advocates,” says Bell (2017, p. 2095).
She has experienced, atmost, (possibly idle) threats—that the next time a police officer
sees her, he will mace or even arrest her. These threats, these forceful words, would
not register as “uses of force” in the most sophisticated studies of police encounters.
Yet they have constrained her movement (Bell 2017, p. 2095).
As James Forman, Jr. (2017) similarly observes:
Swearing and yelling, making belittling remarks, issuing illegitimate orders, conduct-
ing random and unwarranted searches, demanding that suspects “get against the
wall”—these behaviors rarely led to lawsuits or newspaper coverage. But for residents
of the city’s poorest neighborhoods, especially young people, this treatment became
part of the social contract, a tax paid in exchange for the right to move in public spaces
(p. 171).
Bell (2017) characterizes Shawna as “a thoughtful young woman who has never had any
serious police encounter, who has managed to avoid getting a criminal record, and who is a
general law-abider, wanting to trust the police but convinced that the police are not
trustworthy for people like her” (p. 2099). At the same time, Shawna’s alienation towards
law enforcement is pronounced—and she no longer wants to be a police officer. “Although
Shawna sees the law and its enforcers as worthy of obedience as a theoretical matter,” Bell
writes, “she does not believe that law enforcement officials see her, and people like her, as a
true part of the polity” (2017, p. 2099).
Accordingly, the structural inequalities between poor Black Americans and their more
privileged counterparts should not only be conceptualized in terms of statistical measures
of wellbeing, but also in the nature of the relationships between these groups and state
institutions. Unequal relationships are not only a matter of practice, but also of law. Paul
Butler (2017) makes this point in his analysis of the Supreme Court case Illinois v. Wardlow
(2000). The Court had to decide whether police could detain and search an individual who
they hadn’t suspected of a crime, but who runs away upon seeing an officer. They ruled that
this practice is legal in high-crime areas—“which almost always means minority
communities”—and nowhere else (Butler 2017, p. 109). This amounts to unequal legal
rights: The resident of a middle-income White neighborhood who attempts to evade a
police officer has a legal right against being searched, but a resident of a low-income Black
neighborhood does not.
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Traffic stops are a related element of the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime where
African Americans experience structural inequalities. Recent research shows that Black
drivers are twice as likely to be pulled over as White drivers (even though White people
drive more), and four times as likely to be searched by police (Baumgartner et al., 2018).
Unsurprisingly, while White Americans report feeling that traffic stops are fair and
reasonable, disproportionate stops make Black Americans feel that “they are not regarded
as full and equal members of society” (Epp et al., 2014, p. 16). Many respond by avoiding
driving in certain places and changing what clothes they wear. “The notorious pass laws in
South Africa under apartheid, which allowed Black people intoWhite areas only if carrying
a pass authorizing entry, worked a similar evil,” write Charles R. Epp and colleagues, “and
no amount of professional courtesy and respectfulness can hide the deep violation at the
core of this practice” (2014, p. 16).
A final example of the structural inequalities that African Americans face relates to what
Dorothy E. Roberts (2003) and others call “community harms.”Race plays an outsized role
in the relative likelihood that one has a family member, friend, acquaintance, or neighbor
who is imprisoned. A study by Hedwig Lee and colleagues (2015) shows that Black men
have incarcerated acquaintances and neighbors at a rate five times higher thanWhite men.
Black women experience the imprisonment of family members at a rate eleven times that of
White women, meaning that close to half of Black women have one or more relatives
serving a prison sentence. Roberts (2003) describes the psychological and emotional toll
that results: “Dealing with an incarcerated relative causes stress, both fromworry about the
inmate’s well-being and from tension among relatives as they struggle to survive the ordeal.
These enormous burdens fall primarily on the shoulders of women caregivers, who
customarily shore up families experiencing extreme hardship” (p. 1282). This reality is
unsurprising, given the very concept of mass incarceration—viz., a criminal justice system
inwhich, as perDavidGarland’s (2001) seminal definition, “it ceases to be the incarceration
of individual offenders and becomes the systematic imprisonment of whole groups of the
population” (p. 2).
Failure of the Rule of Law
Murphy (2017) does not formally list rule-of-law failure as one of her criteria for identi-
fying transitional contexts, but it nevertheless plays an important analytic role as an aspect
of pervasive structural inequality. Securing the rule of law is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for overcoming pervasive structural inequality and achieving a just societal
transformation (Murphy 2017). For our purposes, discussing rule-of-law failure in low-
income Black communities highlights a distinctive third commonality between the
U.S. context and traditional transitional contexts.
The rule of law is an essential part of any stable and legitimate political order.When the
rule of law is present, this allows political subjects to make informed decisions concerning
their own conduct and its legality. Here, it is widely known what the law is and the ways in
which it will be enforced. If you, as a political subject, want to avoid engaging in illegal
activities, chances are that you will know how to avoid engaging in illegal activities: Don’t
commit crimes and the criminal justice apparatus of the state will not bother you. “When
the requirements of the rule of law are respected, legal rules shape the general contour of
political relationships…” Murphy (2017) writes. “When declared legal rules actually
govern conduct, citizens can… form reliable expectations, based on legal rules, of how
other citizens and officials will respond to their actions” (p. 124).
There are many ways in which theU.S. imprisonment and policing regime falls short of
instantiating the rule of law, especially in low-income African American communities.
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Given that the present-day imprisonment and policing regime in the United States is
closely linked to a longstanding “law and order” ideology, this is cruelly ironic (Alexander
2010; Hinton 2016; Murakawa 2008, 2014). Thomas Hobbes ([1651]1994), once charac-
terized good laws as “needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous” (p. 229).
Many misdemeanor statutes in the United States fail the Hobbesian standard. Take §18.2-
322 of theVirginia Code, whichmakes public spitting aClass 4misdemeanor. Spitting on a
sidewalk may be gross, but it is not harmful, and importantly, is not the kind of thing that
individuals typically think about when they reflect on what the law prohibits. Yet laws
against public spitting and other order maintenance laws converge into a body of crimi-
nalized conduct that is extremely large. The scale of order-maintenance offenses is such
that they could never be regularly enforced across the broaderU.S. population without this
smacking of totalitarian rule. Instead, enforcement is a matter of police discretion. Indi-
vidual officers are licensed to arrest individuals for extremely arbitrary and subjective
reasons inWest Baltimore, where Shawna lives, and other communities like it—a hallmark
indicator of the absence of the rule of law.
An important recent study by Alexandra Natapoff (2018) is devoted to the arbitrariness
of the U.S. misdemeanor system. Natapoff provides case after case of individuals arrested
and punished for conduct that no reasonable person would imagine to be legally culpable.
Sometimes individuals are arrested for minor, selectively-enforced order-maintenance
offenses. Sometimes a police officer interprets perfectly innocuous and legal conduct as
something other than what it is. An arrest is then made, the accused pressured into a guilty
plea or convicted for a misdemeanor by a judge in less than three minutes (Natapoff 2018).
The lived reality of law-and-order-driven rule-of-law failure is harsh. A misdemeanor
conviction may mean losing a driver’s license or a brief prison stay, which can easily lead to
the loss of employment. A criminal record, even if one misdemeanor is the only item on it,
can be grounds for rejecting a job applicant. Fines and court fees can be prohibitively
expensive for a low-wage earner, and a failure to pay can have big consequences—more
fines, an arrest warrant in your name, and jail time. “In this manner,”Natapoff writes, “the
misdemeanor process confers relatively unfettered authority on police to formally trans-
form Black men into petty criminals based on minor, often harmless conduct, and
sometimes even when they are doing nothing at all” (2018, p. 157).
Rule-of-law failure is often associated with corrupt state officials. This kind of corrup-
tion is certainly reported in the United States. In an interview study of youths living on
Chicago’s South Side, a teen namedChristopher describes an encounter with police where
“They stopped us, and they asked me where the fuck I’m going. Then that’s when they
went inmy pockets, threwmy keys, and tookmymoney” (Futterman et al., 2016, p. 134). A
recent book by Baltimore Sun journalist Justin Fenton (2021) is devoted to Baltimore police
sergeant Wayne Jenkins and other members of the elite Gun Trace Task Force, whose
crimes included the targeted theft of money and drugs from victims deliberately chosen for
their perceived lack of epistemic credentials.
However, it might also be construed as a failure of the rule of law when fines and court
fees make up significant municipal revenue streams. The Department of Justice’s pattern-
or-practice investigation of the Ferguson, MO police department notoriously found that
Fergusonmunicipal court’s “primary goal”was not “administering justice or protecting the
rights of the accused,” but rather, funding the city coffers: “City, police, and court officials
for years have worked in concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the enforcement
process, beginning with how fines and fine enforcement processes are established” (DOJ
2015, pp. 42, 10). Here themunicipal code itself plays a key role, “address[ing] nearly every
aspect of civic life for thosewho live in Ferguson”—for example, barking and off-leash dogs
and grass that grows too high (DOJ 2015, p. 7). (Again, Thomas Hobbes: “Unnecessary
laws are not good laws; but traps for money” ([1651]1994, p. 229).) Researchers have found
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that themore time police devote to collecting revenue, the less violence and property crime
are addressed (Goldstein et al., 2020). There is, moreover, a strong correlation between a
city’s reliance on fines and fees for revenue generation and the percentage of residents who
are Black (Sances and You, 2017; Singla et al., 2020).
Another source of revenue is the practice of civil asset forfeiture. Colloquially referred to
as “legal larceny,” civil asset forfeiture allows a person’s property to be seized if police allege
that it has been used in the commission of a crime. A 2015 Institute for Justice report uses
the example of Philadelphia to describe how a city can serve as “a forfeiture machine”:
Pennsylvania state law enables agencies to retain 100 percent of the value of forfeited
property, and law enforcement in Philadelphia took inmore than $69million between
2002 and 2013. That total comprises more than 1200 houses, 3400 vehicles, $47
million in cash, and various other items, such as electronics and jewelry. The total also
represents almost one-fifth of the district attorney’s general, appropriated budget.
With those funds, Philadelphia has paid for equipment, maintenance, education and
training, and salaries of personnel, this last of which represents themost direct conflict
of interest for the unbiased administration of justice. Conspicuously, Philadelphia
spent none of its forfeiture funds on proactive, community-based anti-drug and crime
prevention programs, despite proponents’ claims that forfeiture funds are essential to
supporting such efforts (Carpenter et al., 2015, p. 16).
The report also tells the story of Charles Clarke, a Black college student whose life savings
were taken by police who searched him formarijuana at the airport. Clarke carried $11,000
on him because he was in themiddle ofmoving and didn’t have a bank in the area to deposit
it in, but officers didn’t believe him. Though they charged him with no crimes—there was
no evidence he had committed any—taking his money didn’t require this (Carpenter et al.,
2015). Fortunately forClarke, the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm,
took on his case pro bono and got his money back (Institute for Justice 2016). Many other
individuals in his position are not so lucky. Legal fees can be higher than the value of the
seized assets themselves, and themost common standard of proof in civil forfeiture cases is a
preponderance-of-evidence standard, setting an extremely low bar for the government to
prove its case (Carpenter et al., 2015). The rule-of-law failure that legal larceny represents
is hardly colorblind: a recent study of 2278 police departments across the United States
found that the forfeiture revenue of cities correlates strongly with the percentage of
residents who are racial minorities (Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2021).
Is the United States a Transitional Political Context?
The U.S. imprisonment and policing regime has been characterized as involving normal-
ized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality, and the failure of
the rule of law. Such an institutional order is seriously deficient from the standpoint of
justice, so much so that “there exists a right to rebel” (Murphy 2017, p. 47). In his book on
the political ethics of urban ghettos, Tommie Shelby (2016) argues this point at length.
When the Black residents of segregated inner-city neighborhoods “engage in criminal
activity or show contempt for legal requirements and law enforcement officials, this is
widely regarded as a blameworthy failure of reciprocity on their part,” Shelby observes, but
“no citizen can be expected to tolerate serious, burdensome, and repeated injustices over
the course of their lives” (2016, pp. 214-215). Shelby draws on John Rawls’ ideal of society
as a fair systemof social cooperation, something that undergirds the legitimacy of the state’s
claim to political authority and the obligations of individuals to comply with the law. A
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Rawlsian framework suggests that if the basic structure of society is deeply unjust, for those
unjustly disadvantaged, there is no binding duty of obedience to the law, and self-respect
may even require out-and-out defiance of it (Shelby 2016).
If normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality, and
the failure of the rule of law are features of a deeply unjust regime—to such an extent that
they generate a right of disobedience—are these features also sufficient to consider the
United States a transitional political context? Murphy (2017) posits two additional criteria
—serious existential uncertainty and fundamental uncertainty about authority—for identifying
transitional societies. Let us consider each in turn.
Serious Existential Uncertainty
The category of serious existential uncertainty refers to the idea that transitions sometimes
result from the cessation of war or negotiations between representatives of warring groups.
Here, it is widely understood to be a tense and fragile political moment, where it is unclear
“whether a particular moment is the temporary turbulence of the ancient regime or really a
break that might lead somewhere new” (Murphy 2017, p. 67). At first glance, the idea of
serious existential uncertainty seems potentially fitting as a description of the racial justice
protests of Freedom Summer 2020. The peaceful demonstrations that erupted across the
United States and worldwide after George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis saw clashes
between law enforcement and protesters. Vandalism and rioting broke out, with the left
blaming right-wing extremists who showed up and the right blaming leftist anarchists and
antifa (MacFarquhar 2020). Against this backdrop, there were calls to defund the police
that seemed to move some public officials and law enforcement budget cuts were imple-
mented. There seemed to be the possibility of transformative change, with protestors
telling the press, “This time is different” (Sobey 2020).
If a complete overhaul of theU.S. imprisonment and policing regime comes about, then
surely the protests of 2020 will go down in the history books as a crucial moment in the
transition. Many states are undertaking police reform, and at the time of this writing, the
Department of Justice’s current budget proposal shows attempts to reduce racial profiling,
excessive force, and practices like “no-knock” warrants (Jenkins 2021; Treisman 2021;
Wilson 2021). Furthermore, the prison population in theUnited States has been in gradual
decline since 2009. However, though some experts decreed “the beginning of the end of
mass incarceration” (Goode 2013), more recent analyses show that the current rate of
decline is not enough to change the overall fact of mass incarceration (Ghandnoosh 2020;
see alsoMartin and Price, 2016). Dismantlingmass incarceration would seem to need to be
a matter of public policy, undertaken at the state, federal, and local levels, deliberately
aimed at this end (Epperson and Pettus-Davis, 2017). ToddR.Clear (2021) puts thematter
succinctly: “[A]s amatter of policy, we determine howmany people are in prison. If wewant
a smaller prison population in the United States, we should send fewer people to prison,
and make the stays of those we send to prison shorter” (p. 257). Evelyn J. Patterson (2017)
emphasizes the importance of sending fewer people to prison—via decriminalization and
alternative sentencing practices—as hermodel shows shortening prison stays to have only a
modest effect on reducing the prison population size.
There is some evidence emerging of the political will for ending mass incarceration.
A 2015 book features essays critical of mass incarceration from politicians across the
political spectrum, including conservative figures like Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and Scott
Walker (Chettiar and Waldman, 2015). “Our nation is beginning to understand certain
fundamental truths,” reads the volume’s introduction. “Mass incarceration exists. It is not
needed to keep down crime. It comes at a huge cost to the country. And there are practical
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solutions on which we can agree to reduce our prison population, while keeping the
country safe” (Chettiar and Waldman, 2015, p. 1; but see Gilmore 2015). However, as
Peter K. Enns (2016) argues, the problem is not just politicians. It is also a punitive
American public.The end ofmass incarceration is unlikely ifU.S. voters remain committed
to a punishment paradigm and fail to see crime as a public health problem (Pfaff 2017). Of
course, the latter is easier when drug crimes are the issue; it is much harder when the issue is
violent crime, with its tangible, sometimes life-altering impact on the lives of victims.
Indeed, violent crime is on the rise, a political liability for Democrats (Olsen 2021). While
journalists question the wisdom of the idea of defunding the police, a number of cities are
reversing the budget cuts they had made (Jamerson 2021).
In light of all this, does U.S. society qualify as a society that is experiencing serious
existential uncertainty? It seems that this judgmentwould be premature at themoment.We
might imagine a future where U.S. voters and public officials no longer saw the solution to
violence as more violence, where there were deep, long-term policy commitments to
decarceration and depolicing across the nation. Here, a number of existential questions
would likely arise. Would there be the political will, energy, and resources for providing
mental health care, education access, and job opportunities in communities that are
currently underserved and overpoliced? Would underlying structural inequalities be
transformed? If crime rates increased, would a decarceration and depolicing regime be
hastily replaced with a return to the “law and order” days of old? As we readMurphy, this is
the kind of political context that would indicate that the United States is truly a society in
transition, not our current one, where the grip of the present imprisonment and policing
regime remains strong.
Fundamental Uncertainty about Authority
This brings us to Murphy’s other category, fundamental uncertainty about authority.
Here, the United States seems to depart strongly from paradigm transitional contexts—
the category describes political situations where “citizens and sometimes officials in
transitional circumstances do not assume, and indeed in some cases openly question and
challenge, the authority of the new government” (Murphy 2017, p. 74). Though numerous
examples could be brought in as illustrations, take just one—that of East Timor. Colonized
by Portugal in the sixteenth century, East Timor declared independence in 1975 but was
immediately annexed by Indonesia. A military occupation ensued; subsequent decades saw
the killings of civilians and protestors, displacement, forced starvation, torture, andmilitary
sex slavery. An increasingly organized East Timorese resistance movement, a new Indo-
nesian president, and a series of diplomatic negotiations led to an UN-sponsored inde-
pendence vote on August 30, 1999, where the people of Timor-Leste overwhelmingly
voted to break from Indonesia. Themilitary responded with what JovanaDavidovic (2012)
characterizes as a scorched-earth response: “Close to half of East Timor’s population was
displaced, over seventy percent of all infrastructure was destroyed, and 1300 people were
killed in the violence that erupted prior to and after the vote” (p. 84). Australianmilitary and
UN security forces staged a successful humanitarian intervention, and in October 1999,
helped establish a transitional administration which held power until 2002. In May of that
year, a parliamentary government took over, completing the East Timorese independence
process (see Auweraert 2012; Davidovic 2012; Evans 2012; Fernandes 2010).
Though normalized collective and political wrongdoing, pervasive structural inequality,
and the failure of the rule of law long characterized East Timor, two political periods
referenced above reveal fundamental uncertainty about authority. The first is in the
mid-1970s, when East Timor rapidly went from being a Portuguese colony to an
12 Jennifer M. Page and Desmond King
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X21000357
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 16 Nov 2021 at 10:21:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
independent nation to an Indonesian occupied territory. The second is the period from
1999 to 2002. It looked like the independence vote outcome would be violently repressed
until international security forces intervened. Fragile political circumstances were then
overseen by two governments, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, before the political situation stabi-
lized under the latter. On Murphy’s understanding, these two periods are appropriately
characterized as transitional. The first, of course, resulted in further upheaval and repres-
sion, while the second brought the independence the East Timorese people had for so long
sought.
It is valuable to identify what is distinctive about political contexts like East Timor’s and
to distinguish these from contexts like that of theUnited States. InEastTimor, therewere a
clear and identifiable regime changes that created a “uniquely liminal moment” between
the past and future (Gray 2010, p. 62). When transitional justice mechanisms were
implemented to provide truth, accountability, and reparations for the violent abuses
associated with the Indonesian military occupation, there was a widespread understanding
that the days of military rule were over. Of course, the transition did not assure the end of
violence: The first few years of independence saw riots and political volatility, and in 2006,
an attempted coup resulted in over three dozen deaths and the destruction of over a
thousand homes (Auweraert 2012). Nevertheless, as a clear-cut empirical matter, a regime
change had taken place. However, if no regime change occurs, using the tools of transi-
tional justice in order to construct a liminal moment between the past and future risks
superficiality.4 In Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Glen
Sean Coulthard (2014) is critical of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
and PrimeMinister StephenHarper’s 2008 apology. Both treated residential school abuses
as part of an unjust past while remaining silent on the present injustice of denying
Indigenous nations a land base and political self-determination. As such, Canada’s program
of transitional justice buttressed an illusory narrative asserting that its injustices towards
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples were the product of a bygone illiberal era, and that
there had at one point been a regime change: In fact, settler-colonialism was and is very
much the Canadian modus operandi. Importantly, the issue wasn’t simply a matter of
acknowledging the past while failing to acknowledge the present. Acknowledgment can
only go so far. If Canada had recognized its colonial present, this would not have been the
same as decolonization (Fisher 2021).
Increasingly in the United States, the tools of transitional justice are cited as the
appropriate response to the country’s imprisonment and policing regime, as well as to
structural and institutional anti-Black racism more broadly. In 2015, the city of Chicago
passed a reparations ordinance containing material and symbolic forms of redress for the
African American victims of police torture—suffocation and electric shocks were among
the methods used to forcibly extract confessions—in the 1970s and 1980s (Taylor 2016).
Bryan Stevenson (2017), founder and director of the Equal Justice Initiative, advocates a
national “process of truth and reparation” as the appropriate way of addressing mass
incarceration (p. 4). Journalist Juleyka Lantigua Williams (2018) proposes layered repara-
tions and an official apology to persons whose socioeconomic background led to their
imprisonment. Others advocate for municipalities to pay reparations to the families of
victims of police killings (Page 2019); there is also discussion of Drug War reparations
(Flanigan and Freiman, 2020).
The most prominent proposed path to federal-level reparations for slavery, Jim Crow,
and present-day structures of anti-Black racism is laid out in the bill H.R. 40. Introduced in
theHouse of Representatives everyCongressional session since 1989,H.R. 40would set up
a commission to study proposals for reparations to African Americans (Congress.gov
2021a, 2021b). The current version has 188 cosponsors, more than at any other point in
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the bill’s history, and hearings were held on it in 2019 and 2021. Another Congressional
resolution aims at establishing a U.S. Commission on Truth, Racial Healing, and Trans-
formation (Congress.gov 2021c, 2021d). A 2019 Business Insider poll found support for
reparations among 54% of survey respondents identifying as moderately or very liberal,
suggesting a sizeable shift among a share ofWhite liberals in recent times (Haltiwanger and
Hickey, 2019; cf. Dawson and Popoff, 2004). State and local efforts around truth and
reparation are currently taking place in Maryland, California, Evanston, IL, Chicago, IL,
Asheville, NC, Burlington, VT, Amherst,MA, and Providence, RI (O’Brien andAx, 2021).
There is little doubt that the progress towards reparations is a momentous achievement
on the part of reparations advocates and activists, especially considering the
U.S. government’s longstanding refusal of redress to formerly enslaved people and their
descendants (Berry 2005; Boxill 2003). But there is a danger of seizing upon the tools of
transitional justice—the promise of truth and reparation—as a way of reckoning with the
past and present without simultaneously undertaking measures that constitute a genuine
break with both. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing the ways in which the present-day
United States is not transitional political context. To deny that the United States is
currently in a moment of transition is to call attention to the insufficiency of existing
efforts to move away from its imprisonment and policing regime. “It may be normatively
desirable to end repressive regimes and longstanding conflicts,” Murphy writes, “but a
society is only transitional when there are efforts taken to realize this end” (2017, p. 70).
Regime Change in the United States and Abolition Democracy
When transitional injusticemechanisms such as truth-telling and reparations programs are
implemented in the Global North, the context is not that of a traditional regime change,
where one government dissolves and a newly-constituted government replaces it. It is
worth concluding our analysis with a discussion of what a genuine transition would look
like in Global North countries—an area of the transitional justice literature that is greatly
undertheorized, we should add. Is it even meaningful to use the language of “regime
change”?
In our view, it is. The word “regime” has different meanings: It canmean a government,
and also, a way of doing things. This latter sense of “regime” is closely connected to what
American Political Development scholars refer to as an “institutional order”—viz., “a
coalition of governing state institutions, nonstate political institutions, and political actors
that is bound together by broadly similar senses of the goals, rules, roles and boundaries
that members… wish to see shaping political life” (King and Smith, 2005, p. 78). For
Desmond King and Rogers M. Smith (2005), there is never just one institutional order
operating at a given time. Rather, competing institutional orders form the backdrop to
politically contested issues. Competition between two salient racial institutional orders—a
“White supremacist” order and an “egalitarian transformative” order—“explain[s] many
features of American politics that may appear unrelated to race, such as congressional
organization, bureaucratic autonomy, and modern immigration priorities,” they argue
(King and Smith, 2005, p. 78). At the same time, one racial institutional order may
completely dominate the other in a given political arena, such as that of the criminal justice
system. When an institutional order is dominant, it helps form and maintain a regime
manifesting its internal logic. In the criminal justice context, a White supremacist racial
institutional order—and its successor, an “antitransformative” racial order that has
responded to racial egalitarianism’s “bar[ring] the deployment of overtly white supremacist
language” (King and Smith, 2005, p. 84)—have undergirded what we have been calling the
U.S. imprisonment and policing regime.
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Many scholars have argued for the centrality of race in explaining the rise of U.S. mass
incarceration beginning in the 1970s. Prior to this decade, crime rates were going up, but as
Jeremy Travis and colleagues (2014) argue, “the best single proximate explanation of the
rise in incarceration is not rising crime rates, but the policy choices made by legislators to
greatly increase the use of imprisonment as a response to crime” (p. 3). On Vesla
M. Weaver’s (2007) theory, the policy choices that gave rise to mass incarceration were
not only backlash to the Civil Rights Movement by White elites, as some have proposed,
but something more insidious: “frontlash,” where “losers in a conflict become the archi-
tects of a new program, manipulating the issue space and altering the dimension of the
conflict in an effort to regain their command of the agenda” (p 236). Michelle Alexander
(2010) uses the lens of racial control to analyze theWar on Drugs, with mass incarceration
functioning to uphold a racial caste system. Similarly,NaomiMurakawa (2014) emphasizes
the ideology of “racial liberalism” espoused by White liberals in the postwar period,
describing how it gave rise to a racialized law-and-order agenda and the carceral state.
However, the picture painted by Weaver, Alexander, and Murakawa has not been uncrit-
ically accepted. Forman (2017) and Michael Javen Fortner (2015) each highlight how
African Americans contributed to mass incarceration, particularly members of the Black
middle class. JohnPfaff (2015)writes about a shift in prosecutor behavior in the early 1990s,
revealing a newkind of punitiveness “inspired in no small part by a desire to use the criminal
justice system (perhaps poorly) to try to rectify structural problems in relatively high-crime
communities” (p. 177). Elizabeth Hinton’s (2016) analysis complements Pfaff’s in certain
respects: she discusses how the War on Crime that began in the 1960s was a deeply
misguided effort to address poverty-related problems faced by economically struggling
Black communities. However, the concept of a racial institutional order does not require
explicit White supremacist/antitransformative intent—or conversely, egalitarian transfor-
mative intent—but rather describes the “pressures to alter or tomaintain the nation’s racial
ordering” operating at a subterranean level (King and Smith, 2005, p. 84). To deny that
racial institutional orders matter to the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime is to deny
that race matters. This, few would deny.
This brings us to regime change in theGlobal North. Here, as Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and
Colm Campbell (2005) argue, the idea of sweeping political change often meets stubborn
resistance: “Whereas nondemocratic societies may be faced with demands for institutional
transformation, in democratic societies the imperative is typically to reform rather than to
transform” (p. 187). A strong presumption that Global North countries “do not commit
systematic violations of human rights” is operative, based on the notion that “once the
initial breach is discovered, [a country’s] own internal human rights protections should
provide correctives and prevent reoccurrence” (Ní Aoláin andCampbell, 2005, p. 207). But
systematic violations of human rights do occur, thus “the language of reform alonemay not
be sufficient to deliver the institutional and structural changes demanded by the transi-
tional process” (Ní Aoláin andCampbell, 2005, p. 187).Hence the utility of the language of
regime change in the Global North context: There is a built-in contrast with reformist
efforts that preserve the status quo.What would it mean for the United States to undergo a
regime change, then? In our view, if an egalitarian transformative racial institutional order
came to dominate over its White supremacist/antitransformative counterpart, and was the
fundamental determinant of what punishment and policing looked like in the United
States, this would amount to a genuine transition.
This way of thinking about transitional justice in theUnited States has a connectionwith
abolition democracy. In present-day activist circles, abolition democracy “calls for a
constellation of democratic institutions and practices to displace policing and imprison-
ment while working to realize more equitable and fair conditions of collective life”
(McLeod 2018, p. 1618). The term was originally coined by Du Bois ([1935]1998) to
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describe a Reconstruction-era ethos that didn’t see ending slavery as sufficient, but was
“convinced that [abolition] could be thoroughly accomplished only if the emancipated
Negroes became free citizens and voters” incorporated “into the body civil, politic, and
social, of the United States” (Du Bois [1935]1998, pp. 184, 189).5 Davis (2005) argues for
the relevance of abolition democracy to contemporary abolitionist projects. “[I]t is not
only, or not even primarily, about abolition as a negative process of tearing down, but it is
also about building up, about creating new institutions,” she writes (p. 73). We cannot
abolish prisons “by wielding axes and literally hacking at prison walls” but must demand
“new democratic institutions that take up the issues that can never be addressed by prisons
in productive ways” (Davis 2005, p. 76). In her essay, “Constructing a Criminal Justice
System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework,” Roberts (2007) takes a similar
stance. She proposes various measures aimed at dismantling the system of mass incarcer-
ation, from halting the construction of new prisons to outlawing the death penalty.
“Abolishing these institutions should be accompanied by a redirection of criminal justice
spending to rebuild the neighborhoods that they have devastated,” she goes on to write.
“There should be a massive infusion of resources to poor and low-income neighborhoods
to help residents build local institutions, support social networks, and create social
citizenship” (p. 285).
We see abolition democracy as providing a vision of the kind of regime change to which
a country like the United States should aspire. It preserves transitional justice’s long-
standing idea of democracy and democratization as aims, and is directly concerned with
how U.S. practices of imprisonment and policing undermine democratic citizenship, all
while being wary of reformist projects that fail to challenge punishment as society’s default
response to interpersonal and state violence.
Abolition democracymoreover presents a cohesive vision of how a transition away from
the U.S. imprisonment and policing regime and the transitional justice measures of truth
and reparation fit together. Allegra M. McLeod (2018) discusses the contemporary
abolitionist movement’s on-the-ground experimentation with alternatives to
punishment-focused responses to violence. One example is the movement for reparations
as a response to the Chicago police department’s use of torture, where the focus was on
truth-telling and the victims’ needs rather than locking up the officers who had sent many
innocent Black people to jail. She quotes activist Mariame Kaba:
[T]he reparations ordinance… [is] an abolitionist document… [b]ecause it’s a docu-
ment that did not rely on the court, prison, and punishment system, to try to envision a
more expansive view of justice. Sowhile financial restitutionwas a part of that package,
it also did a whole bunch of other things… [in terms of] rethinking justice for people
who have been wronged, survivors of violence… Chicago is the first municipality in
history to ever pass a reparations bill for law enforcement violence. So that’s some-
thing that other cities are looking at for themselves now, as avenues for justice that are
not personal and individual indictments of the police, not calls for cops to be jailed…
(McLeod 2018, p. 1628).
This brings us to a related and final point about how abolition democracy and transi-
tional justice—at least on some understandings—fit together. There is a large debate
within the transitional justice literature about the extent to which there should be a focus
on criminally prosecuting the individual perpetrators of human rights abuses (e.g., Fletcher
andWeinstein, 2002; Leebaw 2011; Méndez 2001; Orentlicher 1991), whether restorative
justice and other “therapeutic” methods of accountability wrong victims by letting tor-
turers and other evildoers off the hook (e.g., Moghalu 2004; Wilson 2001; cf. Ame and
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Alidu, 2010), whether low-level participants in violence should receive amnesty (e.g.,
Malamud-Goti 1990;Mallinder 2014), whether “individualizing”wrongdoing via criminal
trials misrepresents the systemic and collective nature of mass violence (Fletcher and
Weinstein, 2002; Leebaw 2011), and so on. Abolition democracy takes a firm stand on
the issues in this debate, siding with those who advocate pursuing alternatives to criminal
punishment, affirming the moral worth of victims through repair rather than retribution,
and thinking about violence systematically rather than in individualistic terms. In the
context of the present-day United States, these dynamics were on display when Derek
Chauvin, the police officer who murdered George Floyd, was found guilty. Journalist
Moya LothianMcLean (2021) comments on the novelty of mainstreamDemocrats calling
the criminal conviction “accountability” not “justice”—since justice would require sweep-
ing structural changes aimed at overhauling a sociopolitical systemwhere Black people face
endemic, multifaceted violence.
Four years ago, perhaps, Chauvin’s conviction would have led to widespread raucous
celebration and numerous politicians declaring that ‘justice has been served’…But we
are battered and wiser. It’s not just the abolitionists with decades in the trenches who
now recognize that the criminal justice system and imprisonment are not synonymous
with ‘justice’—not when those same institutions are responsible for trapping the
George Floyds of this world in deadly carceral cycles of criminalization in the first
place (McLean 2021).
A similar observation can bemade about reparations. Suppose thatH.R. 40 became law and
reparations proposals formulated by an H.R. 40 commission were enacted. This would
provide accountability for the federal government’s role as a perpetrator and collaborator
in centuries of race-based violence against Black Americans. But unless accompanied by a
regime change aimed at disrupting the deadly carceral cycles of criminalization and anti-
Blackness, this would not be justice.
Conclusion
An April 2021 report by the International Center for Transitional Justice The Color of
Justice: Transitional Justice and the Legacy of Slavery and Racism in the United States (Ladisch
and Roccatello, 2021), cautions against dismissing the United States as a country to which
transitional justice is applicable. “A common misconception is that transitional justice can
only be applied in a society that is undergoing a significant transition, either at the end of a
conflict or during a transfer of power,” the authors of the report write. “However, while
such a transition does facilitate efforts to reform institutions and redress past atrocities,
what is needed are a political, social, and cultural opening and a public demand for change”
(Ladisch and Roccatello, 2021, p. 2).
Many authors who advocate using the tools of transitional justice to reckon with state-
sponsored racial violence and human rights abuses in the United States and other Global
North countries aim to persuade those who feel that no such reckoning is needed. They are
skeptical of a sharp “emerging” democracy–“established” democracy distinction that too
often functions to obfuscate or deny race-based injustice and structural inequalities. But in
emphasizing that transitional justice is not only for contexts commonly viewed as transi-
tional, the point often gets lost that justice requires a transition.6 As we have argued, the
United States is not currently in a transitional moment with regard to its imprisonment and
policing regime—the racial justice protests of 2020 notwithstanding, a genuine transfor-
mation away from this regime is not yet underway. “It is time,” as Dorothy Roberts (2007)
Transitional Justice 17
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X21000357
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 16 Nov 2021 at 10:21:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
wrote, “for a third Reconstruction ushered in by a movement that cracks the racial order
reinforced by the mass imprisonment of African Americans” (p. 272).
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Notes
1 Authors like Thomas Obel Hansen (2011), Stephen Winter (2014), Dustin Sharp (2015), as well as Harry
Hobbs (2016) argue against making the formal regime change context an essential part of the definition of
transitional justice.
2 See also Mihai (2016): “Democratic shifts are generally seen to cover changes exemplified, at one end of the
spectrum, by such phenomena as the rights revolution in the United States and, at the other, by the more
profound transformations of societies coming out of major conflict and oppression” (p. 36). On this formu-
lation, the United States has had transitional moments—the rights revolution, and of course, the end of
enslavement and the Civil War, which is more paradigmatically a post-conflict transition—but is not currently
a transitional society.
3 Collateral consequences can also result from the sheer fact of a criminal conviction, even if one does not serve
prison time.
4 This is not to say that the context of a formal regime change is any guarantee that the tools of transitional justice
will not be used superficially. Susan Harris Rimmer (2010) argues that East Timor’s transitional justice efforts
were inadequate in important respects, particularly concerning female victims of rape, forced marriage, and
military sex slavery.
5 Abolition democracy’s downfall was, according to Du Bois, an eventual anti-democratic alliance with business
interests: “Thus a movement, which began primarily and sincerely to abolish slavery and insure the Negroes’
rights, became coupled with a struggle of capitalism to retain control of the government as against Northern
labor and Southern and Western agriculture” (Du Bois [1935]1998, p. 214).
6 This criticism is by no means aimed at the ICTJ report referenced: Virginie Ladisch and Anna Myriam
Roccatello (2021) point out a number of formal measures that could be undertaken to significantly reduce
imprisonment and policing-related violence.
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